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Article 2

Three Federalisms
Randy E. Barnett*
ABSTRACT

Debates over the importance of "federalism" are often obscured by
the fact that there is not one, but three distinct versions of constitutional
federalism that have arisen since the Founding: Enumerated Powers
Federalism in the Founding era, Fundamental Rights Federalism in the
Reconstruction era, and Affirmative State Sovereignty Federalism in the
post-New Deal era. In this very short essay, my objective is to reduce
confusion about federalism by defining and identifying the origin of
each of these different conceptions of federalism. I also suggest that,
while Fundamental Rights Federalism significantly qualified
Enumerated Powers Federalism, it was not until the New Deal's
expansion of federal power that Enumerated Powers Federalism was
eviscerated altogether.
To preserve some semblance of state
discretionary power in the post-New Deal era, the Rehnquist Court
developed an ahistorical Affirmative State Sovereignty Federalism that
was both under- and over-inclusive of the role of federalism that is
warranted by the original meaning of the Constitution as amended.

I. INTRODUCTION
In this essay, I will explain how there are not one, but three distinct
versions of federalism that have developed since the Founding of this
country. Each version of federalism developed during a different era in
our constitutional history: The Founding and afterwards, Reconstruction
and afterwards, and the New Deal and afterwards. One reason we do not
distinguish each of these versions from the others is that we teach
Constitutional Law by doctrine or topic rather than chronologically by
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era. l
When taught chronologically, these different versions of
federalism fairly leap off the page. With these versions clearly in mind,
we can observe a considerable irony in how federalism is currently
debated among the Justices and among law professors who, to a
remarkable degree, tend to follow the lead of the Supreme Court.
II. THE FOUNDING AND AFTER: ENUMERATED POWERS FEDERALISM
Let us begin at the beginning. Federalism at the Founding can best
be described as "Enumerated Powers Federalism."
The national
government was conceived as one of limited and enumerated powers.
The powers of states were simply everything left over after that
enumeration. This version of federalism is reflected in the words of the
Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
2
states respectively, or to the people."
It is useful to remember that, while versions of the Tenth Amendment
were proposed at several state ratification conventions, James Madison,
who first proposed it to the House, considered it to be superfluous and
unnecessary. According to Madison, "Perhaps words which may define
this more precisely, than the whole of the instrument now does, may be
considered as superfluous. I admit they may be deemed unnecessary;
but there can be no harm in making such a declaration ....3
Contrast this attitude with Madison's opinion about the need to add
what eventually became the Ninth Amendment, 4 which he said guarded
against "one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged
against the admission of a bill of rights into this system," 5 namely:
that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration, and it might follow by implication, that those were not
singled out, were intended to be assigned into the rights which
hands
6
of the general government, and were consequently insecure.
In the Tenth Amendment, federalism is protected solely in terms of

1. See RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT (forthcoming 2008).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 458-59 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1834) (statement of
Rep. Madison).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
5. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing ConstitutionalAmendments (June 8, 1789),
in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 437, 439 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).

6. Id. at 488-89.
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what remains after powers are "delegated to the United States." 7 There
is no affirmative statement about the scope of state powers. Indeed, the
Tenth Amendment is entirely noncommittal about which of the reserved
powers reside in the states and which in the People. 8 Presumably, the
allocation of the reserved powers was to be determined by state
constitutions, but I say "presumably" because the Tenth Amendment
does not tell us this. That state constitutions allocate the reserved
powers between the people and the states is an unenumerated theory by
which to construe the Constitution.
With Enumerated Powers Federalism, the powers of states are
protected by holding Congress to its delegated powers. What states do
beyond this with their "police power" 9 is not a matter for the national
government in general, or the federal courts in particular, to decide. But
there are at least three exceptions to this general observation that
became significant in the years following the Founding, and a fourth
possible exception that could have become significant but did not.
First, Article I, section 10 of the Constitution says: "No state shall...
pass any . . . ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts .... 10 This was thought to require the Court to decide when
exercises of the police power violated either or both of these express
restrictions on federal power."I
Second, the Court had to decide how the police power of a state
related to the power of Congress to "regulate commerce ... among the
several states." 12 Because Congress enacted few, if any, laws regulating
interstate commerce, the early conflict between the Commerce Power of
Congress and the police power of states arose in the context of the socalled "dormant" Commerce Clause, which posed the question: Under
what circumstances, and to what extent, is the police power of states
limited when states regulate some internal activity that is also part of
interstate commerce? In addressing this issue, the Taney Court took a
7. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
8. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Constitution is silent on whether the qualifications clause is
exclusive).
9. While scattered references to the "internal police" of a state are found in the records of the
Founding, the term "police power" seems first to have appeared during the period of the Marshall
Court. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 429, 476-78 (2004) (discussing the origins of the police power).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10.
11. See Forrest McDonald, The Constitution and Hamiltonian Capitalism, in How
CAPITALISTIC IS THE CONSTITUTION 49, 58-62 (Robert A. Goldwith & William A. Schambra
eds., 1982)
12. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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number of tacks, but it tended to qualify the scope of federal power over
intrastate activity by assessing whether a state was properly exercising
its police power over its internal affairs. 13 In other words, the
unenumerated concept of the police power of states provided a
constraint on Congress' unenumerated dormant Commerce Clause
power.
The third qualification that arose after the Founding came from the
infamous Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution. 14 In Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,15 the Supreme Court held that this Clause empowered
Congress to enact the Fugitive Slave Act and that this power overrode
the police power of individual states to protect free blacks within their
borders from being wrongfully seized as slaves. Given that the powers
enumerated in Article I, Section 8 did not include such a power, the
Court implied it from the injunction of Article IV. 16 In other words, in
Prigg, an unenumerated federal power to enforce the Fugitive Slave
Clause was deemed by the Court to overpower the unenumerated police
power of states. This ought to undermine the stereotypical association
of "states rights" with slavery. What the abolitionists referred to as
"The Slave Power" was happy to assert federal power on behalf of
slavery when it had the votes in Congress and on the Court.
A fourth qualification that failed to develop, but might have, was the
adoption of the abolitionist interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 1, which reads, "The citizens
of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states."1 7 Some abolitionists read this Clause to protect
the fundamental rights of all citizens from infringement by state
governments. 18 Instead, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was

13. See, e.g., Mayor of the City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837) (defining the scope
of the federal government as limited from areas where the state is properly exercising its police

power).
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be
discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom
such service or labor may be due.").

15. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
16. Id. at 619 ("The end being required, it has been deemed a just and necessary implication,
that the means to accomplish it are given also.").
17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
18. See Robert M. Cover, Formal Assumptions of the Antislavery Forces, in JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 156 (Yale University Press ed., 1975)

(stating that no law under any form of government can be inconsistent with national law and
man's natural rights); Chester Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (1967) (asseting
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limited by the courts to barring discrimination against the fundamental
rights of out-of-state citizens in favor of in-state citizens. 19 Still, the
abolitionist theory of the Privileges and Immunities Clause contributed
importantly to adoption of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
20
Fourteenth Amendment during Reconstruction.
III. RECONSTRUCTION AND AFTER: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FEDERALISM
The adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments by the
Thirty-ninth Congress constituted a significant modification of the
Enumerated Rights Federalism of the Founding. Although preserving
the enumeration of powers of Congress as a limit on federal power, the
Reconstruction Amendments significantly altered the balance of federal
power and the nature of federalism.
The exact scope of the original meaning of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments is a complex subject. Suffice it to say that the
Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress and the courts the power to
protect individuals from the badges and incidents of slavery. I would
maintain that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment amended the Constitution so as to adopt the abolitionist
21
reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Under this reading, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment has four
moving parts, the last three of which correspond roughly to the three
branches of government. 22 After the citizenship clause, comes the
Privileges or Immunities Clause according to which states are
prohibited from enacting laws that infringe upon the fundamental rights
of any or all of their citizens. In other words, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause prohibits legislation that either violates fundamental
that all citizens are to be protected from state action or inaction which would deny them their
fundamental rights).
19. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868) ("It was undoubtedly the object of the clause
in question to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States,
so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.").
20. See David S. Bogen, The Privilegesand Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 37 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 794, 796 (1987) (stating that conceptions of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in 1787
support propositions that all laws fall under Article IV).
21. Although I intend to do more work to establish this claim, for now see RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 61-66, 195-96 (2004).
22. Here is how Section I reads with the four parts indicated in brackets: [1] "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside." [2] "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;" [3] "nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;" [4] "nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
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rights across the board, or discriminates in their recognition and
protection. In addition, the judicialprocess by which laws that satisfied
the Privileges or Immunities Clause were applied to particular persons
could be scrutinized under the Due Process Clause, while the Equal
Protection Clause required that state executive branch officials enforce
otherwise constitutional laws in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
Consequently, under this reading of the Fourteenth Amendment,
limitations on the powers of Congress recognized by Enumerated
Powers Federalism of the Founding were altered to add a new federal
power to protect the fundamental rights of citizens from violation by
states in the creation, application, and enforcement of state laws.
Regrettably, this alteration of federalism by the Reconstruction
Amendments was judicially repealed by the Supreme Court. Beginning
with the infamous Slaughter-House Cases,23 the Court effectively
removed the Privileges or Immunities Clause-the operational heart of
the Fourteenth Amendment under this reading-from the Constitution
by restricting its scope to protecting rights of national citizenship
only-such as the right to be protected while on the high seas. By this
maneuver, it restored to the states complete discretion in the protection
of fundamental natural rights as well as the privileges of the Bill of
Rights, qualified only by a ban on racial discrimination by states that it
later held could be satisfied by the so-called "separate but equal"
treatment of blacks 24
With the dawn of the Progressive Era, however, the Supreme Court
began to expand the Due Process Clause to occupy some of the vacuum
created by its previous redaction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
In particular, the Court extended the Due Process Clause beyond the
judicial application of laws to individual persons to the reasonableness
of the laws themselves when such laws restrict liberty. 25 Later, it
extended the Equal Protection Clause beyond the equal enforcement of
the law by the executive branch to barring discriminatory laws
26
themselves.

23. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872).
24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-52 (1896).
25. See, e.g., Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)
(holding that a state court judgment authorized by a state statute allowing for private property to
be taken for public use without just compensation violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (holding that a New
York law limiting the number of hours a baker could work in a week violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
26. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1967) (declaring Virginia's antimiscegenation statute unconstitutional).
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While the gradual and tentative expansion of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses restored a bit of the Fundamental Rights
Federalism of the Reconstruction Amendments, this expansion came
under bitter attack from "progressives" who contended that it violated
principles of federalism by which states could use their police powers to
enact social legislation free of interference by federal courts. With the
onset of the Great Depression, the stage was set for a new
"progressive" 27 approach to federalism by justices nominated by the
progressive Republican Herbert Hoover, 28 who were eventually joined
by others appointed by Franklin Roosevelt.
IV. THE NEW DEAL AND AFrER: AFFIRMATIVE STATE SOVEREIGNTY
FEDERALISM

The Fundamental Rights Federalism of the Reconstruction Era
superimposed the protection of fundamental rights from infringement
by states on the Enumerated Powers Federalism of the Founding Era.
Preserving Enumerated Powers Federalism, which limited the powers of
Congress, still protected a vast domain of state power. However, when
the New Deal Supreme Court gave Congress a virtually unlimited
legislative power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses, it effectively repealed the enumerated powers scheme of
Article I. By so doing it thereby destroyed the Enumerated Powers
Federalism that resulted from these limits. Now Congress had both the
power to reach virtually any private activity in the nation via the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses and the power to restrict
the powers of states via the expanded Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
True, the post-New Deal Court did eventually limit the scope of the
Due Process Clause to protecting only what footnote four of Carolene
Products referred to as "a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. '29 But neither the
Ninth nor Tenth Amendments were deemed by the Court to be among
these "specific prohibitions," and eventually the limitation of footnote
four was at least partially overcome when, in Griswold v. Connecticut3 °
and later cases, the Court extended the Due Process Clause to protecting

27. See Progressivism,THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2306 (6th ed. 2001-05)
28.

See generally JOAN HOFF-WILSON,

HERBERT

HOOVER: FORGOTTEN

(1975).
29. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).

PROGRESSIVE
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an unenumerated right of privacy. 3 1
Enter the Rehnquist Court. After William Rehnquist became Chief
Justice, the Court began developing what came to be known as the
"New Federalism," but which in this story could be called "Affirmative
State Sovereignty Federalism."
First came its so-called Tenth
Amendment cases of New York v. United States,3 2 Gregory v.
Ashcroft,33 and Printz v. United States.34 In each of these cases, the
Court attempted to create a special state exemption from federal powers
that would easily have reached the conduct in question if performed by
35
a private party.
Then came the so-called Eleventh Amendment cases of Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida36 and Alden v. Maine37 which immunize
states from some lawsuits in federal court. I use the term "so-called"
advisedly. 38 The irony of the New Federalism is that the text and
original meaning of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments had to be
distorted to provide a "principle" of state sovereignty that would be
used by the more textualist and conservative justices to carve out of the
expansive post-New Deal federal power an affirmative exception for
states.
As the preceding discussion has made clear, however, the more
faithful way of protecting federalism would be to limit Congress to its
enumerated powers and let states take up the slack-that is, Enumerated
Powers Federalism-except where states have violated the Fourteenth
Amendment or other constitutional restrictions on their power-that is,
Fundamental Rights Federalism.
It was this approach that the
Rehnquist Court began very tentatively to adopt in United States v.

31. For an extended discussion of the developments described in this paragraph, see Randy E.
Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2008).
32. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
33. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
34. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
35. See, e.g., id. at 934 (holding that obligations imposed by a federal statute on a state's law
enforcement officers to run background checks on prospective handgun purchasers were
unconstitutional); New York, 505 U.S. at 175 (holding that a "take title" provision of a federal law
offering states the choice of either taking ownership of waste or regulating according to
Congress' instructions violated the Tenth Amendment); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473 (holding that a
provision of the Missouri Constitution requiring mandatory retirement for judges reaching age
seventy does not violate equal protection law).
36. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
37. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
38. See Randy E. Barnett, The People or The State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729 (2007).

2008]

Three Federalisms

Lopez 39 and United States v. Morrison.40
Notice that by striking down the Gun Free School Zone Act in Lopez
as beyond the power of Congress to enact, the Court protected the right
of the people to keep and bear arms without having to apply the specific
prohibition of the Second Amendment. 4 1 Likewise, it also served to
protect the reserved powers of states without having to appeal to any
unenumerated principle underlying the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments.
After the Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich,42 however, it remains
to be seen how much of this version of the New Federalism is still alive.
I have explained elsewhere how Raich can be limited if enough justices
so desire, 4 3 but we will have to await a case that does not involve
marijuana to see if there is still a judicial will to restore any semblance
of Enumerated Powers Federalism.
V. CONCLUSION
At the Founding, federalism was a by-product of the enumerated
powers scheme of Article I. After Reconstruction, while this version of
federalism was preserved, it was importantly modified by
superimposing a new federal check on the police power of states. By
contrast, the New Deal Court completely transformed the nature of
federalism by effectively repealing the enumerated powers scheme of
Article I. So long as this view of federal power holds sway, preserving
the discretionary powers of states has required an affirmative protection
of state sovereignty that is "carved out" of federal power-in the same
way that the Court feels it must affirmatively recognize a particular
44
individual liberty as a "fundamental right" before it may protect it.
Otherwise, constitutional federalism would be altogether extinguished.
In this way, the Rehnquist Court's Affirmative State Sovereignty
Federalism preserved some role for federalism while largely remaining
within the post-New Deal paradigm of unlimited federal power that is
qualified by specific prohibitions.

39. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zones
Act).
40. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) (invalidating a portion of the
Violence Against Women Act).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
42. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22-32 (2005) (upholding the constitutionality of the
prohibition imposed by the Controlled Substances Act as applied to medical marijuana in states in
which its use is authorized and regulated by state law).
43.

See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword:Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743, 743-44

(2005) (noting that in the future cogent dissenters may carry the day).
44. See e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also, Barnett, supra note 30.
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Ironically, by ignoring the original meaning of particular clauses, the
Court has moved constitutional law in the direction of the original
meaning of the Constitution in its entirety. Expanding the scope of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses beyond their original
meaning has partially compensated for the redacted Privileges or
Immunities Clause, moving the Fourteenth Amendment, as a whole,
closer to its original meaning. Similarly, expanding the scope of the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments beyond their original meanings
prevents the complete absorption of the states by federal power, and
restores some semblance of the balance formerly achieved by holding
Congress to its now-eviscerated enumerated powers.
In my view, however, much is distorted by both back-door
maneuvers. First, expanding clauses beyond their original meaning to
compensate for previous misinterpretations is both under- and overinclusive in ways too numerous and complex to identify here. Second,
the perceived need to expand the meaning of clauses to reach what are
perceived to be the right results has delegitimated the idea of hewing to
the original meaning of the Constitution. Third, by depriving justices of
the ability to base their decisions on a textual meaning that precedes and
is independent of their own preferences, judicial review has been
delegitimated as well.
Finally, when liberated from the original meaning of the Constitution,
both left and right became free to use the courts both to pursue their
political agendas and to obstruct the political agendas of their
opponents. This, in turn, has led to the politicization of the judicial
selection process that we are experiencing today. When judges are no
longer constrained by a written constitution, you'd best see that your
judges get on the courts and that your opponent's nominees are blocked
wherever possible.
All these consequences, and many more, are the prices to be paid for
abandoning the original meaning of the Constitution as amended-the
whole Constitution-each and every clause of it. And these costs are
incurred when the Court is protecting "federalism" without recourse to
the original meaning of the constitutional provisions that were designed
to define and protect it.

